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Abstract
Revelation is roughly the thesis that we have introspective access to the essential nature of our conscious states. This thesis 
is appealed to in arguments against physicalism. Little attention has been given to the problem that Revelation is a source 
of pressure in the direction of epiphenomenalism, as introspection does not seem to reveal our conscious states as being 
essentially causal. I critique Hedda Hassel Mørch’s ‘phenomenal powers view’ response to this difficulty, before defending 
a form of the ‘consciousness+’ response.
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1  Revelation and the Threat 
of Epiphenomenalism
Revelation is roughly the thesis that we have introspective 
access to the essential nature of our conscious states. When 
you attend to your pain, according to Revelation, you can 
thereby come to know what is essentially involved in feel-
ing that way. In Goff (2017), I argued that the philosophi-
cal case for the non-physicality of consciousness hangs or 
fall on Revelation.1 If Revelation is true, and our conscious 
states have a physical nature—feeling pain essentially con-
sists in the firing of c-fibres—then we would have introspec-
tive access to that physical nature, which is patently not the 
case (neuroscience is not that easy!). If Revelation is false, 
then it is the job of scientific investigation to determine the 
essential nature of consciousness, and hence there can be 
no philosophical grounds for disputing the physicality of 
consciousness. I went on to argue that Revelation is true and 
hence that physicalism is false, but I will not repeat those 
arguments here.
There is much discussion of whether the alleged causal 
closure of the physical pushes anti-physicalists towards epi-
phenomenalism. But there is little attention giving to the 
problem that Revelation itself is a source of pressure in the 
direction of epiphenomenalism. For not only does intro-
spection not reveal our conscious states to be essentially 
physical, it does not reveal them to be essentially causal 
either. Reflection on the phenomenal character of a red expe-
rience does not reveal it to have any essential dispositions; it 
seems perfectly conceivable that red experiences should do 
nothing at all. But given Revelation, any essential disposi-
tions of our conscious states ought to be accessible to us. We 
can press the difficulty with the following argument from 
Revelation to epiphenomenalism:
The Revelation Argument for Epiphenomenalism
Premise 1—If Revelation is true and our conscious states 
have some dispositions essentially, then introspection 
would reveal that our conscious states have some dispo-
sitions essentially.
Premise 2—Revelation is true.
Premise 3—It is not the case that introspection reveals 
that our conscious states have some dispositions essen-
tially.
Conclusion 1—Therefore, it is not the case that that our 
conscious states have some dispositions essentially.
Premise 4—If it’s not the case that our conscious states 
have some dispositions essentially, then epiphenomenal-
ism is true.
Conclusion 2—Therefore, epiphenomenalism is true.
One straightforward way around these difficulties is 
to adopt a contingentist view of dispositions, i.e. a view 
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according to which entities have all of their dispositions 
contingently. There are two main forms of this position:
• Humeanism—Facts about dispositions are ultimately 
grounded in contingent facts about how physical entities 
are arranged across space and time.
• Strong laws—Facts about dispositions are determined by 
the contingent laws of nature, which exist as governing 
entities in their own right over and above the entities they 
govern.
In either case, premise 4 is false: despite not having any 
dispositions essentially, conscious states will nonetheless 
instantiate dispositions in virtue of the relevant contingent 
facts (patterns of arrangement on the Humean view, the laws 
of nature on the strong laws view).
If one is happy with one or other of these contingentist 
views, these problems disappear. However, contingentist 
views have been subject to powerful critique2; as a result, 
an increasing number of philosophers subscribe to powers 
theories, according to which facts about dispositions are 
grounded in facts about the essential nature of fundamental 
entities. Powers theories come in many shapes and size; in 
some versions powers are grounded in categorical proper-
ties, in others all fundamental properties are powers.
The argument above is mainly aimed at power theorists 
who accept Revelation. Admittedly, this is a fairly narrow 
target, but there are enough philosophers in this category to 
make the argument worth exploring. And of course, if there 
are powerful arguments for Revelation and for some form 
of power theory, as I believe there are, then it becomes all 
the more important to work out how a Revelation-commit-
ted powers theorist can account for the causal efficacy of 
consciousness.
2  The Phenomenal Powers View 
and the Consciousness+ Hypothesis
In this issue and elsewhere, Hedda Hassel Mørch defends the 
view, contra premise 3 of the above argument, that conscious 
states do have certain dispositions essentially and that this 
fact is introspectively apparent.3 This is the specific form of 
power theory known as ‘the phenomenal powers view.’ It is 
upon reflection apparent to us, Mørch claims, that there is a 
necessary causal connection between pleasure/pain and the 
motivational states associated with them:
Pain and pleasure appear to cause their effects in a 
distinctively dispositional or powerful way. Intuitively, 
pain seems to make subjects who experience it try to 
avoid it, whereas pleasure seems to make them try to 
pursue it. It is also difficult to conceive of pain and 
pleasure producing different, and especially opposite 
effects, i.e., pain making someone try to pursue it, or 
pleasure making someone try to avoid it. Note that 
the immediate effects of pain and pleasure are mere 
volitions rather than successful actions, i.e., mere try-
ings or attempts at avoidance and pursuit respectively 
(understood as mental events). Therefore, even if it is 
fully conceivable that volitions come apart from their 
effects (i.e., the actions they are aimed at), it may still 
be inconceivable that motivational properties such as 
pain and pleasure come apart from their effects (i.e. the 
mere volitions they motivate).4
To be clear, Mørch does not hold that, as a matter of 
necessity, pain always leads to trying to avoid; obviously 
people very often endure pain for various reasons. Mørch 
claims, quite plausibly, that the necessary connection 
between a disposition and its manifestation is ceteris pari-
bus: pain causes its bearer to try to avoid it in the absence 
of interference.
There is certainly something strange with the idea that 
pain should (ceteris paribus) cause its bearer to pursue it 
(or pleasure cause its bearer to avoid it), and this is some-
thing I think the opponent of the phenomenal powers view 
is obliged to explain (I will endeavor to do this below). But 
there doesn’t seem anything incoherent in the idea. It seems 
at least coherently conceivable that there could be certain 
odd creatures whose pain produces attraction compulsions 
and whose pleasure produces avoidance compulsions. 
Indeed, Mørch is willing to concedes this to an extent: she 
accepts that this seems to be conceivable in so far as we are 
assuming a Humean or a strong laws view. In the light of 
this, Mørch proposes that the necessary connection between 
pain and avoidance is conditional: If pain causes something 
in virtue of its intrinsic character, then pain causes trying 
to avoid. It is conceivable in a Humean or strong law world 
that pain generally causes its bearer to try to pursue it, but it 
is not conceivable that pain causes its bearer to try to pursue 
it in virtue of its intrinsic nature.
This conditional power of pain does not, in itself, avoid 
the threat of epiphenomenalism. We merely have a guarantee 
that if pain causes something in virtue of its intrinsic nature, 
2 Lewis (1982) and Strawson (1987).
3 Mørch (2014, 2018a, b, forthcoming).
4 This issue. In footnote 19 of this paper, Mørch responds to an 
objection concerning pain asymbolia by defining ‘pain’ to mean 
states that include the affective element of pain. I will follow her ter-
minological choice (we can make an analogous terminological choice 
with respect to pleasure).
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then it causes trying to avoid. In order to make sense of 
pain actually causing something, we need to give an account 
of what satisfies the antecedent of the conditional, of what 
makes it the case that pain actually does cause something in 
virtue of its intrinsic nature. Mørch suggests two possibili-
ties. Firstly, it could be that the possibility of pain not caus-
ing anything is only prima facie and not ideally conceivable, 
that is to say, an ideal reasoner would not find it conceivable 
that pain not cause the will to avoid. This response is in ten-
sion with a Revelation-based argument against physicalism, 
which I have argued is the core of the consciousness-based 
challenge to physicalism. The anti-physicalist contends that, 
given Revelation, if pain had a physical nature, then we’d 
know about it. But if the anti-physicalist can say that an 
aspect of pain’s essentially causal nature has not yet been 
discerned by us even though it is available to ideal reasoners, 
then why cannot the physicalist make the analogous move by 
holding that the physical nature of pain is available to ideal 
reasoners despite the fact that we have not yet discerned it?
Mørch is aware of this worry, and responds to it by say-
ing, ‘…it is coherent to suppose that we are…able to reason 
ideally about those aspects of phenomenal properties that 
rule out that they are identifiable with physical properties, 
but at the same time not…able to reason ideally about those 
aspects that imply that they are powerful.’5 Fair enough, 
but the onus is surely on the anti-physicalist to say what the 
difference is between the two cases and it’s not clear what 
could be said in this regard. In neither case are we dealing 
with some complex mathematics or conceptual subtlety that 
might foil the non-ideal reasoner.
Mørch’s alternative proposal is that there might be non-
phenomenal features of pain that, as it were, activate its 
causal capacity. This seems to be a version of the ‘con-
sciousness+’ hypothesis I defend in Goff (2017): the view 
that a conscious state such as pain is an aspect of a more 
expansive property—pain+—such that plain+ has both phe-
nomenal and non-phenomenal aspects. In Mørch’s view, it 
is the non-phenomenal aspects of pain+ that activate the 
causal powers of pain.
The specific version of the consciousness+ view I for-
mulate in Goff (2017) is a bit different. I defend the view 
that there are no necessary causal connections between pain 
itself—considered in isolation from any other properties—
and its causal effects, but nonetheless that the whole pain+ 
property, which subsumes pain as an aspect, is necessarily 
causally connected to its effects. As it were, when God looks 
down at pain+, it is inconceivable that pain+ not be disposed 
to produce certain outcomes, including presumably trying 
to avoid. There is a temptation to interpret this as the view 
that the phenomenal aspect of pain+ is epiphenomenal, that 
it is really the non-phenomenal aspects that are doing all the 
work, dragging the phenomenal feel of pain along for the 
ride. But it is coherent to suppose that the phenomenal feel 
of pain does make a causal contribution, but only as part of 
the whole consciousness+ property.
On this view, pain, considered in itself, is not directly 
connected to trying to avoid; but there is an indirect neces-
sary connection between these two things. Pain is essentially 
disposed such that, in combination with the non-phenomenal 
aspects of pain+, it causes trying to avoid. But a reasonable 
construal of Revelation is consistent with this disposition of 
pain not being introspectively accessible. According to Luke 
Roelofs’ definition, for example, revelatory knowledge of 
a property X yields knowledge only of those of X’s essen-
tial properties which don’t also involve another property 
Y, where Y is not itself grasped.6 If the causal capacities 
of pain+ essentially involve both its phenomenal and non-
phenomenal aspects, then there is no reason to think that 
mere knowledge of its phenomenal aspects should allow one 
to deduce the potency of the combination.
Hence, the proponent of the consciousness+ hypothesis 
can respond to the above revelation argument for epiphe-
nomenalism by denying premise 1:
Premise 1—If Revelation is true and our conscious states 
have some dispositions essentially, then introspection 
would reveal that our conscious states have some dispo-
sitions essentially.
and replacing it with Premise 1*:
Premise 1*—If Revelation is true and our conscious 
states, considered in isolation from all other states, have 
some dispositions essentially, then introspection would 
reveal that our conscious states have some dispositions 
essentially.
With the argument thus modified, we can infer:
Conclusion 1*—Therefore, it is not the case that that our 
conscious states, considered in isolation from all other 
properties, have some dispositions essentially.
However, we cannot infer epiphenomenalism from Conclu-
sion 1*. So long as conscious states make a casual contribu-
tion, perhaps as part of consciousness+ properties, epiphe-
nomenalism is avoided.
Whether one goes with Mørch’s version or my version 
of the consciousness+ hypothesis depends on whether 
you believe that the dispositional nature of pain is at all 
5 Mørch (2018a). 6 Roelofs (forthcoming).
 P. Goff 
1 3
introspectively apparent. And whether you think this may 
depend on what seems to you conceivable. Contra Mørch, it 
seems to me perfectly conceivable not only that pain should 
cause subjects to try to pursue it, but that pain should do this 
in virtue of its intrinsic nature. When I reflect on how pain 
feels, I can find no necessary causal connection with any 
kind of behavioural effects.
Having said that, there does seem something very weird 
about the idea of pain causing attraction volition. People on 
my side of the debate are obliged to give some account of the 
‘gut feeling’ of absurdity attached to the idea of pain being 
separated from trying to avoid (or pleasure being separated 
from trying to pursue). My view is that there is a neces-
sary connection between pain (considered in isolation from 
pain+) and trying to avoid, but that it is a normative rather 
than a causal connection. It is rationally appropriate, all 
things being equal, for pained creatures to try to avoid their 
pain. The absurdity we feel in the idea of a creature whose 
pain causes attraction and whose pleasure causes avoidance 
is not the absurdity of incoherence but the absurdity of deep 
irrationality. We may also be implicitly assuming when we 
imagine such a scenario that the conscious subject in ques-
tion is a rational agent, in which case they will be disposed, 
all things being equal, to avoid pain and pursue pleasure. 
But to suppose this is already to suppose the efficacy of the 
mental, which is the very thing we are here trying to explain.
One point in favour of this account of the situation is that 
the sense of absurdity we feel when imagining a pain/pleas-
ure invert (i.e. an imaginary creature whose pleasure plays 
the causal role that pain plays in a normal human being, 
and whose pain plays the causal role that pleasure plays in 
a normal human being) is not present when we reflect on 
inversion cases involving conscious states that don’t have 
such strong normative implications, such as colour expe-
riences. The sense of absurdity we feel in the case of the 
pleasure/pain invert is entirely lacking in reflecting on the 
case of a colour experience invert. The best explanation of 
this, I suggest, is that the sense of ill-fit in the case of pleas-
ure/pain invert is rooted in the normative implications of 
the conscious states involved, which is why we don’t have 
the same sense of ill-fit when reflecting upon the case of the 
colour invert. Colour experiences presumably have no less 
causal power than pleasure/pain experiences, so if the ill-fit 
was rooted in the causal powers, then why is it not equally 
apparent in colour invert cases?
On this basis, I suggest that the anti-physicalist should 
respond to the Revelation-based threat of epiphenomenal-
ism by accepting that our conscious states, conceived of in 
isolation, lack essential causal powers, whilst at the same 
time holding that our conscious states do make a causal con-
tribution as part of our consciousness+ states. This is not 
an entirely satisfying view, as we seem to have no positive 
grip on the non-phenomenal aspects of our consciousness+ 
states. However, we have known since Hume that the ground 
of natural necessity is hidden from us. The benefit of being 
a proponent of Revelation is that at least one aspect of con-
crete reality is known to us: the reality of consciousness.
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